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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

M. S. COSTELLO,

Respondent,
vs.

JOHN I. KASTELER, and URANIUM
CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a Corporation,
Appellants.

Case
No. 8759

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant John I. Kasteler is the president of the
defendant corporation, the Uranium Chemical Corporation,
which corporation is engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling fertilizer, with its place of business in Midvale,
Utah.
Sometime in the early part of October 1956, Mr. Kasteler
and the respondent had negotiations over the telephone with
3
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respect to the employment of the respondent by the appellants,
for the purpose of transporting the respondent's backhoe up
to Alta in the Cottonwood district for the purpose of loading
trucks, to be furnished by the appellants with certain material
the appellants were mining for the purpose of manufacturing
fertilizer.
Some three or four conversations were had by these respective parties over the telephone with relations to employment and the price to be charged. It is the contention of the
respondent that he was hired on the basis of $1.50 per ton
for loading,a nd it is the contention of the appellants that
the respondent was hired on the basis of $15.00 per hour
(Tr. 24-25-26) (Tr. 47-48).
Pursuant to these conversations between Appellant and
Respondent, the Respondent, on or about the 11th day of
October 1956, transported his % backhoe up to Alta, and
during a working period of approximately 27 hours loaded
the material on trucks for the appellants in an amount of 770
tons (Tr. 36).
Just after the completion of the job the appellant tried to
contact the respondent to pay him for his services, but could not
make contact with the respondent until sometime later (Tr. 49).
When they finally got together the respondent refused to take
a tender by appellants of $15.00 per hour and insisted that
the agreement was at the rate of $1.50 per ton (Tr. 49-50),
which the appellants refused to pay, contending that the agreement was $15.00 per hour (Tr. 49-50} The respondent
refused to accept the tender of $15.00 per hour and subsequently instituted suit against the appellants, first by com4
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mencing suit against the appellant John I. Kasteler and then
by amended complaint against John I. Kasteler and the Uranium
Chemical Corporation on the theory of an express contract
of $1.50 per ton. The matter came to trial before the Honorable
Aldon Anderson, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, and judgment was rendered in favor of
the respondent and against the appellants on the basis of the
reasonable value of $1.50 per ton for 770 tons, less 125 tons
allowed as a set off for earth excavated by respondent contrary to instructions, or a total of $1,024.13 including interest
(Tr. 70-71-72), from which judgment the appellants take
this appeal.
At the trial of this cause, when the respective parties
announced their readiness for trial, counsel for respondent
made a motion to amend respondent's amended complaint by
interlineation by adding the words, both in the complaint
and in the prayer of the complaint, "or for the reasonable
value thereof," which amendment was permitted by the court
over the objections of the appellants, but if allowed, the
appellant was not prepared to meet the issues of reasonable
value, as it was the contention of the appellants that the complaint was based on an express contract and not upon the
reasonable value of the services.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE RESPONDENT TO AMEND HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT
5
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BY INTERLINEATION TO CHANGE HIS CAUSE OF
ACTION FROM ONE OF AN EXPRESS CONTRACT TO
ONE OF REASONABLE VALUE FOR SERVICES.
POINT II .•
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS FOR THE SUM OF $967.50 TOGETHER
WITH INTEREST THEREON ON THE BASIS OF THE
REASONABLE VALUE OF SAID SERVICES.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, JOHN I. KASTELER AND
URANIUM CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE RESPONDENT TO AMEND HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT
BY INTERLINEATION TO CHANGE HIS CAUSE OF
ACTION FROM ONE OF AN EXPRESS CONTRACT TO
ONE OF REASONABLE VALUE FOR SERVICES.
It is the contention of the appellants in this matter that
the respondent proceeded against the appellants upon the

6
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theory of an express contract, to-wit, that the defendants owe
the plaintiff the sum of $1,15 5.00 pursuant to the terms. of
an oral agreement between plaintiff and defendants, wherein
the defendants agreed to pay plaintiff $1.50 per ton for excavation and loading in trucks of certain earth. The foregoing
allegations were contained in both the original complaint filed
by the plaintiff against the defendant, John I. Kasteler, and
in the amended complaint in the first and second causes of
action against the defendants, John I. Kasteler and the defendant Uranium Chemical Corporation, with the further
allegations contained therein, "That the agreed value and the
reasonable value of said services is the sum of $1,155.00"
(Tr. 1-8-9).
The allegations therein contained are not in the alternative
but in the conjunctive, and pursuant thereto the defendants
proceeded to trial upon the election of the plaintiff therein
to proceed on the theory of an express contract, and not upon
the theory of the reasonable value of said services.
At the trial of the issues in said matter, upon motion of
the plaintiff and over the objections of the defendants, the court
permitted the plaintiff to amend his amended complaint by
interlineation to insert the following words both in the complaint and in the prayer of the complaint, to-wit: "or the
reasonable value of said services." This was done over the
objections of the defendants, upon the grounds, that if the
plaintiff could not sustain his allegations of an express contract, then to permit him to proceed upon the theory of the
reasonable value thereof. The defendants were not prepared
to rebut the testimony of reasonable value, and requested
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

further time to prepare to meet this issue, which the court
denied and permitted the amendment (Tr. 16-17).

It is the contention of the appellants that the court erred
in permitting this amendment and forcing the defendants to
trial at the time this amendment was allowed, and in support
of this contention we quote the following principals of law:
71 C.

J. S. at page 496,

Par. 281:

"No party should be called into court prepared to
try one issue and then be required to try another, of
which he then for the first time has notice and the discretion of the court should be exercised so as to prevent surprise."
100 Pac. 848. Bowers et ux, v. Good et ux., Washington:

·'The fact that the amendment may introduce a new
issue is not alone grounds for denying it. The true test
is found in the answer to the question, is the opposing
party prepared to meet the issue? His remedy therefor,
when a new issue is sought to be presented, by an
amendment, is not to object to it merely, but to show
in addition that he is unprepared to meet the new issue.
In such a case the trial court will in its discretion either
contiue the case in order to allow him to prepare for
trial of the new issue or deny the right to amend."
71 C. ]. S. page 602, Paragraph 282:

"On the other hand under the general rule that an
amendment will be refused where it would be prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party, an amendment at the trial will not be allowed where it would so
result. The opposing party will be granted an opportunity to make a showing for a continuance, if surprised by an amendment allowed at the trial.''
8
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Safe-Way Cab Service Co. of Oklahoma City v. Gadberry,
27 Pac. 2nd. 434. Oklahoma.
"Amendment should not be permitted where a surprise is worked against a party, or where to permit the
amendments works a departure."
We are not unmindful of the fact that amendments are
liberally permitted by the court in furtherance of justice. This
is elementary law. For that reason we do not deem it necessary
to quote numerous decisions in that respect, as we think what
we have referred to hereinabove is a good example of what
the law is in this respect, but we do contend that in the instant
case, and within the sound discretion of the court the amendment herein allowed by the court should not have been permitted over our objection, simply for the reason that the
appellants came into court on the theory of an express contract
and not upon the theory of the reasonable value of the services
of the plaintiff. The appellants were not prepared to meet this
issue as shown by the objection of the appellant's counsel
(Tr. 16-17).
The evidence in this case quite conclusively shows that
there was no meeting of the minds on the proposed contract
of employment, and if that is a fact the court could not have
reached a decision only upon the principal of the reasonable
value of the services rendered by the plaintiff therein.
In support of this contention we refer to the plaintiff's
evidence as follows:

Q. What did he say to you with respect to this emplayment?

9
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A. He said he had the trucks ready to go, it was just
a matter of him and I getting together on my price
for loading (Tr. 23).
To sustain the appellants' position that the court undoubtedly decided this case upon the theory of the reasonable
value of the services and not upon an express contract we
quote further from the evidence:
Q. How long have you been in the excavating and
loading business, Mr. Costello?

A. I guess since '42.
Q. Were you aware of the prices charged in this area?

Objection to this question made by counsel for appellants
upon the basis that it does not come within the issue of the
pleadings.
Objection overruled by the court.
Q. I was asking you, Mr. Costello, if you are aware
of the prevailing and usual prices charged by excavators in this area for excavating dirt and loading
it into trucks.

A. Yes (Tr. 28.)
The court then interrupted the plaintiff and asked that
his testimony be limited to his services of taking his equipment
to Alta and loading the material, and plaintiff was then asked:
Q. Listen to the question . . . I asked if you had an
opinion what the reasonable value of the service
would be and you said ·yes.' What value do you
think the service would be worth ?

A. I still say a dollar and a half.
Q. A ton?
10
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A. Yes (Tr. 29-30).
Upon cross-examination the plaintiff testified that he and
the defendant, John I. Kasteler, had several conversations about
the employment (Tr. 31), and the plaintiff admits that the
price he quoted was not accepted by the defendants, but regardless of that he went on the job (Tr. 32-33).

Q. You didn't in that conversation arrive at any definite arrangement about your charge?
A. No.

Q. It all summed up then, and you finally talked to him
the night before you left. You argued about the
price per ton and the price per hour, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. He told you to sleep on it?
A. I said, "I will sleep on it but it is still my price."

Q. Now the next day you left and went up, didn't you?
A. Yes.

Q. Without saying anything more to him as to .;hether
he accepted the dollar and a half an hour, or not, is
that right?
A. As far as I was concerned he had accepted.

Q. With that understanding you went up?
A. Yes.

Q. Without any further conversation?
A. Yes (Tr. 32-33).

Q. When you said it would be one dollar and a half
a ton, did he agree to it?
A. No, we hung up. That is the conversation (Tr. 3434).

11
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In view of the questions and answers on the part of the
plaintiff and other similar questions and answers, it would
appear to us that there was no meeting of the minds of these
parties on the price. In view of the testimony it is quite
apparent that Mr. Kasteler understood this was to be done
by the hour at the rate of $15.00 per hour. In view of the unforeseen difficulties enumerated by the plaintiff as to what he
would run into, the more logical reasoning would be that thr
hourly basis would be more advantageous to the plaintiff.
The job, however, went very smoothly and no difficulties
were encountered. Plaintiff worked some thirty-seven hours
including coming and going to the job.

Q. This job went unusually smoothly?
A. Yes, we had no idea it was going to go that smooth
(Tr. 42).
Plaintiff further testified that he could load some 75 tons
per hour as long as he had no interruptions (Tr. 37). At that
rate he would be earning $112.50 per hour at $1.50 per ton,
less of course his time for transportation and setting up.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE
APPELLANTS FOR THE SUM OF $967.50 TOGETHER
WITH INTEREST THEREON ON THE BASIS OF THE
REASONABLE VALUE OF SAID SERVICES.
We are not unmindful of the fact that this court is
reluctant to disturb the decision of the District or trial court,
12
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when the decision is based upon a question or finding of fact,
but we are of the opinion that the decision in this case was not
justified, in view of the fact that there was no meeting of minds
with relation to the price to be charged, and the further fact
of the court permitting an amendment to the amended complaint of the plaintiff at the time of trial when the defendants
were not able to produce other witnesses as to the value of
the services, and over the objections of the defendants, or
granting to defendants sufficient time to meet this issue (Tr.
16-17).
The court, apparently, entirely ignored the testimony of
the defendant Kasteler when he testified at what rate he had
the job done two years previous (Tr. 51). Defendants had
no opportunity to produce other competent witnesses to rebut
the testimony of the reasonable value of the services, upon
which the decision of the court was based, pursuant to the
findings of fact of the court.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, JOHN I. KASTELER AND
URANIUM CHEMICAL CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY.
This action was commenced originally by the plaintiff
against the defendant, John I. Kasteler (Tr. 1). After the defendant, John I. Kasteler, filed his answer, the plaintiff then,
by stipulation of the parties, filed an amended complaint,
(Tr. 7-8-9-10), making both John I. Kasteler and the Uranium

13
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Chemical Corporation parties defendant and proceeded against
both of them.
The law is well settled that where one deals with an agent
of an undisclosed principal, and the contract so entered into is
for the use and benefit of the principal, he may elect to hold
either the agent personally or the principal, but he cannot
hold them both, hence the court erred in this case by not requiring the plaintiff to elect which of the defendants in this
case he intended to charge with this obligation.
The plaintiff testified that Mr. Kasteler in making contact
with the plaintiff did not disclose that he was connected with
the Uranium Chemical Corporation, and pursued to sue him
individually originally (Tr. 18-19) and (Tr. 1).
~vfr. Kasteler testified that the plaintiff knew that he was
President of the Alta United Mines, the owner of the deposit,
and that he had been so informed previously to this transaction
(Tr. 52).

In view of the foregoing it is incumbent upon the plaintiff
to elect which of these defendants he would hold responsible
for this indebtedness.
In support of this contention, that the plaintiff cannot
hold both of these defendants, we quote the following:
Love et al v. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 169 Pac. 951, Utah.
"Upon that finding the court made a conclusion of
law that in settling with said Wilson the appellants
had released all of the defendants, including the respondent. The law seems to be well settled that, in
case of an undisclosed principal, the plaintiff may either
14
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sue the agent or the principal, but cannot obtain judgment against both. Moreover, if the plaintiff knows
that there was an undisclosed principal, and he nevertheless elects to sue the alleged agent, he can thereafter
not pursue the undisclosed principal, since he has
elected to treat the alleged agent as the principal. Lindquist v. Dickson, 98 Minn. 369, 107 N. W. 958, 6
L.R.A.N.S. 729, 8 Ann. Cas. 1024.
Ewing v. Hayward et al., 195 Pac. 970. California:
"Plaintiff, who is seeking to hold the Newmark Grain
Company liable as an undisclosed principal, is not entitled to a judgment against that defendant and the
other defendants also. When one party to the contract
deals with another as principal and afterward discovers that such party was in fact agent for an undisclosed principal, he may elect to hold either the agent,
or, upon discovery, the principal; but he cannot hold
both. The agent is liable because credit was originally
extended to him in the belief that he was acting for
himself. The undisclosed principal is liable on the
theory that, having received the benefit of the contract
made by his agent, he should assume its burdens. There
is but one contract upon which the plaintiff in such
an action can bring suit ... There is, as we have said,
but one contract in such cases. And though the plaintiff
may elect to hold either one of two persons liable on
that contract, either the agent or his undisclosed principal, he cannot make two contracts out of the one
contract by seeking to hold each of those two personal
liable severally as an independent obligor. Nor can
he hold them both liable as joint obligors on one contract . . . .
So we find that, according to the weight of authority,
it becomes the duty of the creditor, after disclosure of
the agency and the identity of the principal, to elect
which of the two he will look to carry out the agree-

IS
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ment of the agent. Note to Murphy v. Hutchinson,
21 L. R. A. N. S. 786.
The plaintiff, as perhaps it had the right to do,
brought the action against the agent and the alleged
undisclosed principal. The lower court instead of requiring plaintiff to make an election at the close of the
case to take judgment against the agent or against
the alleged undisclosed principal, the Newmark Grain
Company, entered judgment against both. This, I
think, is grounds for reversal. Sessions vs. Block, 40
Mo. App. 569; Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. Roquemore,
88 S. W. 449; Wells v. Raymond, 7. N. E. 860; Tuthill
v. Wilson, 90 N.Y. 423.
Gill vs. White, 106 So. 166-67. (Ala.)
"Where one contract merely as the agent of a disclosed principal, he binds either his principal or himself, but not both; and a joint action against both
involves a practical as well as a legal anomaly."
In accordance with the foregoing decisions, it may be
proper! y correct that both Mr. Kasteler as the agent of the
Uranium Chemical Corporation, and the Uranium Chemical
Corporation may be parties defendant to determine which is
liable if at all, but upon discovery of this fact, the plaintiff
must elect whom he will hold. This he failed to do, and by
reason of that the judgment should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The appellants respectfully submit that the trial court
erred in permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint at
the trial of this case in order to prove the issues on the basis
of the reasonable value of the services rendered, when the
16
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complaint and the allegations therein contain a cause of action
on an express contract. The court further erred in not permitting
a continuance of the trial of the case for the purpose of enabling
the defendants to procure witnesses, other than the defendant
Kasteler, to testify to the value of said services, and permitting
the plaintiff to take judgment against the defendants on the
value of said services rather than on the specific contract alleged, as disclosed by the findings of fact of the court.
We respectfully submit that the judgment should also be
reversed upon the grounds that the plaintiff could not take
judgment against both of the defendants, when in fact the
plaintiff proceeded upon the cause against the defendant
Kasteler, and by the plaintiff's testimony he did business with
Mr. Kasteler, and not with the Uranium Chemical Corporation, although the contract was made between plaintiff and
Kasteler for the use and benefit of the defendant Uranium
Chemical Corporation, and not for the use and benefit of Mr.
Kasteler.
Respectfully submitted,

BENJAMIN SPENCE
Attorney for Appellants.
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